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What is the best strategy to pursue when introducing computing, 
to “informate” by creating and sharing as  much information as 
possible, or to “represent” the social processes in question so they 
can  be manipulated and  more completely  controlled?   In  what 
way  does  the  greatly  increased  scale  of  many  current  social 
processes,  referred to as  “globalization,”  affect  the question  of 
basic computing strategy?  This paper argues that increasing scale 
makes the informating strategy even more relevant.  This is done 
by 1)  presenting the case  for a particular way of characterizing 
contemporary social formation reproduction, as demi-global; 2), 
illustrating the value of this characterization through analysis of 
the current world economic  crisis;  3),  making  the specific  case 
that  “informating”  is  crucial  to  coping  with and  resolving  this 
crisis;  4),  acknowledging  some  difficulties  that  informating 
typically encounters in the demi-global work; and 5) illustrating 
why informating should nonetheless demonstrate its superiority.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.1 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 





Computing  strategy;  organizational  informatics;  informating; 
globalization; social informatics.
1. INTRODUCTION: What is 
Computing for, to Informate or to Represent?
Shoshona  Zuboff  ‘s  1988  book,  In  the  Age  of  the  
Smart  Machine: The Future of  Work and Power  [5], identified 
two  dominant  computing  strategies  then  being  used  by 
corporations.   One strategy,  which  she doesn’t  really  name  but 
can  fairly  be  called  a  “representational”  approach,  reflects 
traditional  Taylorization.   In  this  strategy,  work  processes  are 
computer  mediated  in  the  following  fashion:  Algorithms  are 
developed  that  mimic  (represent)  work  practices,  so  that  these 
latter  can  then  be  reorganized  conceptually  and  rationalized. 
Computer-controlled machines  are developed  to carry out or  at 
least  control  the  revised  work,  resulting  often  in  displacing 
workers and marginalizing existing worker skills. 
Zuboff  invented  a  new  term,  “informating,”  for  the 
other,  contrasting  strategy.   When  being  used  to  informate, 
computers  are  deployed  in  existing  productive  processes  to 
generate  as  much  information  about  them  as  possible.   This 
information is then shared very widely, especially with blue-collar 
workers.  While  clearly  an  advocate  of  informating,  Zuboff 
understood that this approach had important implications for the 
organization  of  work.   Whereas  “representing”  marginalizes 
workers,  “informating”  tends  to  marginalize  traditional 
management.  It makes little sense to generate more information 
if it is not shared, especially with those in the best position to act 
immediately on it, the workers carrying out the process.   It also 
makes no sense to share the information if these individuals don’t 
have the authority to act quickly on it.  If work is reorganized to 
give  workers  this  authority,  there  is  much  less  need  for  the 
decision-making  which  has  since  Taylor  been  the  chief 
prerogative of line and middle management.  
For Zuboff, informating was the strategic approach with 
the  greater  potential  to  be  of  benefit.   To  get  this  benefit, 
organizations  have  to  expand  the discretionary  power of  those 
who get the new information, so they could act on it.  In contrast, 
a  representational  approach  reinforces  management  power  and 
extends the ambit of the hierarchy of machines.  
Twenty years later, is there still a case to be made for 
Zuboff’s  preferred strategy?  Is “informating” the most a viable 
approach  to  conceptualizing  what  iSchool  graduates,  or  those 
who study Informatics as a professional field, should be trying to 
do?  (I define the field of “informatics” as the study of automated 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) in use, and 
argue that  our  aim  at  IU’s  professional  School  of  Informatics 
should be to train and educate informists to solve problems, when 
it makes sense to do so, using automated ICTs.)  
Most  of Zuboff’s  were “minicomputing” cases,  where 
manufacturers leased computing time on large computers.  Still, 
my  current,  “post”-PC,  cloud  computing  era  students  in 
Organizational Informatics still find the informating/representing 
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contrast a useful tool for thinking about the ultimate goals of their 
projects.   These projects  require them to identify  an organizing 
context  ripe  for  computerization,  figure  out  what  kind  of 
computer  mediation  makes  sense,  and  conceptualize  structures 
and procedures to identify and help cope with the unanticipated 
correlates which, I try to convince them, commonly complement 
computerization.  I use Zuboff to get them to consider whether, in 
the cases they choose, an informating strategy is more likely than 
the  representing  approach  of  standard  Computer  Science  to 
improve organizational dynamics  substantially.   I point out that 
informating  is  more  compatible  with  the  general  turn  against 
Taylorization  in  Organization  Studies.   I  also  point  out  that  it 
helps answer some key organizational informatics questions, like 
data  to gather, which  information  to create,  and  how to create 
useful  knowledge  out  of  information  glut  so  commonly 
associated with computerization.  
In this paper, I wish to argue that, even in a world in 
which  many  crucial  economic,  social,  and  political  processes 
reproduce  on  a  much  larger  scale,  informating  still  makes 
strategic sense.  I make this argument in response to the call for 
papers  on  the  implications  of  “globalization”  for  the  i-School 
Project in this and previous conferences. The scale increase is in 
some  substantial  part  made  possible  by  ICT adoption.  While I 
presume that iSchool faculty would agree in the abstract that it is 
a good idea to come to terms with ways in which today’s world is 
more  “global,”  my  concern  is  whether  this  increase  in  scale 
changes  what  organizations  (and  thus  informists/information 
scientists) should be trying to do via computing.
Increasing  scale  makes  informating  more  relevant.   I 
will  argue  by  1)  presenting  the  case  for  a  particular  way  of 
characterizing  contemporary  social  formation  reproduction,  as 
demi-global;  2),  illustrating  the  value  of  this  characterization 
through analysis of the current world economic crisis; 3), making 
the specific case that “informating” is crucial to coping with and 
resolving  this  crisis;  4),  acknowledging  some  difficulties  that 
informating typically encounters in the demi-global work; and 5) 
illustrating  why  I  am  still  hopeful  that  informating  will 
demonstrate its superiority.
2. THE DEMI-GLOBAL SCALE OF 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL FORMATION 
REPRODUCTION
Still  in  late  November  2008,  columnists  in  the 
Financial  Times,  the  self-consciously  global  newspaper  that  I 
read every day,  insist  that  we have yet to see the worst  of  the 
current economic crisis.  Having rung crisis bells consistently for 
a year and a half  now, their “dismal  science” standard practice 
that  has,  unfortunately,  proven  accurate.   Not  a  prognosticator 
myself, I wish instead to focus on how the on average increased 
but very uneven scale of social reproduction, generally mislabeled 
“globalization,” is central to the continuing crisis.  
Instead  of  being  “globalized,”  it  is  more  accurate  to 
describe our world as “demi-global.”  By this I mean that, while 
some aspects of current social formation reproduction take place 
on  a  greatly  expanded  scale  (e.g.,  the  reproduction  of  capital, 
displays  of  media  like film),  others continue to reproduce on a 
much less  than global  scale (e.g.,  labor  markets, social  support 
and  economic  regulatory  systems).   Indeed,  some  reproductive 
forms  have  disappeared  (“orphaned”  languages).   Of  direct 
relevance to the current crisis, for example, is the state of national 
regulatory structures.  While many of these were developed and 
strengthened in response to the economic  crisis for the moment 
still called the “Great” Depression, several nations have recently 
dismantled/marginalized  them,  while  the  influence  of 
international  coordination  structures  (International  Monetary 
Fund, World Bank) has also decreased.  
In  sum,  a “demi”  global  world is one in which  some 
reproductive  processes  have  greatly  internationalized,  whereas 
others  haven’t  or  have  even  been  restricted  in  scale.   This 
unevenness  causes  problems  especially  for  capital  reproduction, 
an  activity  increasingly  central  to  general  social  formation 
reproduction  in  the late Twentieth/early  Twenty-First  Centuries. 
Largely a fetishized representation of social relationships, capital 
is  greatly  dependent  upon  things  like  “confidence”—i.e.,  the 
shared belief that, if I act as if my capital is not only real but has 
a certain value, others will  act  similarly,  too.   Notional  entities 
like capital are particularly dependent upon, for example, things 
like  strong  governance  capable  of  enforcing  property  rights  in 
them.   Notional  entities include things like trademarks and (my 
favorite example)  the oxymoronic  “intellectual property.”  At a 
minimum, in order for an international market in capital to exist, 
such enforcers need to be able to enter into and execute reciprocal 
agreements with other enforcers.   Under demi-globalism,  this is 
hard to do.
The  fact  that  social  formations  have  to  reproduce 
themselves  under  conditions  of  demi-globalism  has  greatly 
exacerbated  the current  economic  crisis.   I  agree that  it  seems 
reasonable to see the crisis as sparked by declines in US property 
values.   These  set  off  crises  in  real  property  markets  and  a 
number of foreclosures on mortgages, especially the large number 
of  “sub-prime”  ones.   This  in  turn  lessened  US  consumer 
spending.   Unfortunately, many mortgages had been securitized; 
that is, bundled together, chopped up, and sold as bonds and other 
assets.   Several factors, such as lack of regulation of both these 
markets  and  the  end  of  the  separation  of  deposit-based  from 
investment  banking,  mean  problems  spread quickly  through the 
financial sector.  
Where demi-globalism comes in is that many of these 
securitized  assets  were purchased  by  non-US  entities  and  thus 
amplified the crisis.  Had the problems been contained within the 
US, it is conceivable that securities declining in value might still 
have  found  markets  and  thus  devalued  in  a  manner  that  was 
comprehensible.  However, while the assets were globally owned, 
in the absence of  effective global market regulation,  no general 
market has  emerged.   I  would argue that demi-globalism  made 
such a market unconstructable:  Since they couldn’t be sold, these 
assets couldn’t be valued, nor could values be set on the entities 
that owned them.  Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett [3] reported in 
an early fall 2007 edition of the FT on rueful trader complaining 
that, as the value of assets couldn’t be  “marked to market,” they 
could only be “marked to myth.”  
An  interesting  demi-global  torquing  of  these 
developments  followed  from  the  voluntary  decision  of  several 
nations  and  transnational  businesses  (but  not  all!)  to adopt  the 
new,  Basel  II  standards  of  international  accounting.   These 
require that  assets  be “marked  to market,”  an  action  which,  as 
pointed out above, is impossible if there is no market to which to 
mark  them.   As illustrated by Hank  Paulson’s  abandonment  of 
the efforts to use $700 billion as originally mooted—i.e.,  to buy 
“toxic” assets--there is literally no way to say what these assets 
are worth.   Demi-globalism is a central part of this problem.
Demi-globalism  is  also  central  to  the  adumbrating 
problems of the whole range of “innovative” investments, based 
on deregulation and allowing the slicing and dicing of mortgages 
(not only sub-prime) and other asset classes as well, like credit-
derived obligations (CDOs).  Hedging and “naked short selling,” 
opaque in the absence of global regulation, make things worse.  
In sum, in an unregulated demi-global world, there is no 
way to tell what assets are worth.   Capital that is dormant quickly 
looses  value and can  only maintain  it by being invested, but it 
can’t be invested if its value can’t be measured.   Capital’s ability 
to reproduce itself is at risk, as thus is a social formation based on 
its reproduction.
The  current  crisis  illustrates  the  great  likelihood  that 
demi-globalism  is  unsustainable.   Most  European  governments 
have  responded  by  arguing  for  a  revitalized  set  of  global 
governance institutions,  e.g.,  a “Bretton Woods  II.”   Whether a 
less  demi,  fuller  globalism  can  in  this  way  be  created  and  be 
made  effective enough remain  open questions.   In  particular,  I 
doubt that global governance can be achieved in a stable fashion 
without  real  global  government,  not  something  like the United 
Nations but something to which nations give over major elements 
of  sovereignty.   The  other  possibility  is  a  retreat  to  national 
economies  and  general  abandonment  of  transnational  markets, 
including in capital.   This would radically reduce the scope for 
innovative financial  engineering,  the primary  site of  expanding 
capital in the post World War II era.  Many innovative products 
(e.g., credit default swaps) are probably doomed anyway.  
3. WHY “INFORMATING” IS CRUCIAL TO 
COPING WITH THIS CRISIS
Whether  doomed  or  not,  these  products  of  financial 
engineering indicate how automated ICTs are partly responsible 
for  the  current  crisis.   Their  affordances  were  central  to  the 
creation  of  the  demi-global  world.   While  there  was  a  small 
international  capital  market  before  computing  was  wide spread 
(the post World War II market in Euro-dollars), “instantaneous,” 
“global”  trading,  electronic  funds  transfer,  construction  of 
complex  financial  entities,  etc.,  all  depend  on  computers  being 
broadly  used.   The  deployment  of  complex  automatic  trading 
models would also have been impossible without computing.  
Indeed,  automatic  market  modeling  and  trading,  as 
attempts  to automate  the actions  of  human  stock  traders,  are a 
very good example of the representational approach to computing 
that  Zuboff  critiqued  in  her  book.  The  continued  use  of  these 
models  remained  at  time  of  writing  a  major  impediment  to 
attaining stock market stability.  Americans now agree that totally 
computerized voting is a bad idea; many states have gone back to 
partial or even completely paper balloting.  Is computerization of 
major  aspects  of  the  economy,  especially  the  financial/capital 
aspects, a similarly bad idea?
I submit that it is not computerization in general, but the 
representational  approach  to  computing,  that  is  the  primary 
“contribution” of our field to the current crisis.  Zuboff identified 
an  alternative,  informating.   Indeed,  several  economists  (e.g., 
recent Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz [4] and Paul Krugman [2]) 
have  built  substantial  parts  of  their  careers  on  informational 
critiques of neo-classical economics.   They have pointed out, for 
example,  that  while neo-classical  models  of  market functioning 
assume that perfect or near-perfect information is available to all 
market participants, this in general is far from normally being the 
case.  
Through  an  informating  strategy,  computing  could 
conceivably  solve the Stiglotz/Krugman  informational  problem. 
However, in the current crisis, no one can have knowledge about 
a  key  matter,  the  value  of  assets,  because  this  is  unknowable 
under  demi-globalism.   If  the “unknowability”  of  value  is  the 
center of the current crisis, could an informating approach to ICT 
use make them knowable? 
Yes,  but  only  in  the  presence  of  some  new  public 
policies.   My  recent  book  on  The  Knowledge  Landscapes  of  
Cyberspace [1]  was  prompted  by  “Knowledge  Management 
Fatigue Syndrome,”  the sudden disappearance,  around 2001, of 
talk about KM from the business,  popular, and scholarly press. 
KMFS,  I argued, was explicable as a consequence of the literal 
inability of automated ICTs to manage knowledge.  My analysis 
was that ICTs can’t do this as long as one things of knowledge as 
a thing rather than  as  a social  process,  knowledging.   In  other 
words, we can talk of knowledge existing if and only if there is an 
identifiable  group of  people willing to act  as  if  “X is known.” 
Thus, comprehending social dynamics is as central to managing 
knowledge as is the creation and sharing of representations of that 
knowledge  (e.g.,  documents,  charts,  etc.).   “Informating,”  as 
Zuboff  made  clear,  is  about  more  than  collecting  data  and 
communicating the information created by manipulating it; it is 
also  about  changing  organization  so  people  can  discursively 
interpret the information so they can act on it collaboratively and 
therefore effectively.
If  my  analysis  is  correct,  at  the center of  the current 
crisis is a knowledging problem: how do we get groups of people 
to “act as if” the value of a whole range of assets is known and 
agree on what that value is?  As this is not a discovery problem 
but, in Rumsfeld talk, a “known unknown,” what is needed are 
new, really global, not demi-global, social conventions, one that 
allows people to treat X assets as having Y value.  
4. DIFFICULTIES THAT AN 
INFORMATING STRATEGY WILL 
ENCOUNTER
In the short term, our task as informists  re: the world 
economic crisis is a negative one, to point out all the things we 
don’t know, all the information we don’t have, the data that exists 
about  whose  relevance  we  haven’t  a  clue.  We  information 
scholars  can’t  solve  these  data,  information,  and  knowledge 
problems.   We would also do well, I think, to acknowledge our 
own role in creating the illusion of knowledge as in the structured 
trading instruments that are still contributing to the unknowability 
problem.   We  will,  I  think,  look  back  on  our  claims  about 
handling  financial  complexity  as  another  example,  to go along 
with  computerized  teaching  machines,  Artificial  Intelligence, 
knowledge  engineering,  knowledge  integration,  of  computing 
overreach.
5. WHY I AM NONETHELESS HOPEFUL 
ABOUT THE EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF 
THE INFORMATING PROGRAM IN 
INFORMATICS/INFORMATION SCIENCE. 
We must also work for structures (government as well 
as governance) that promote acceptable conventions.  Indeed, we 
can point with some pride to our ability to create viable standards, 
of which the TCP/IP protocol is only one example.  We also have 
experience  with  creating  new  forms  of  organization,  like  the 
Internet  Society,  able  to  project  a  standardizing  influence  over 
processes  of  social  reproduction  that  operate on a  transnational 
scale—e.g., the Internet.  
Still, our governance “successes” are largely limited to 
signal engineering.  They focus on the medium, not the message 
and its meaning.  Our problem in the crisis—indicative, I would 
argue, of a world stuck in demi-globalism—is how to help figure 
out  what  the  signal  means—a  problem  if  knowledge,  not 
information, science.  
Our task, then, is to revitalize the computing enterprise; 
first,  by  acknowledging  our  part  in  creating  the problem,  then 
projecting “informating” as a way to address it.  In particular, we 
can draw on our experience in creating protocols and forms that 
move closer to truly global reach to suggest ways out of the demi-
global cul de sac toward real globality.  We also would do well to 
acknowledge  that  an  effort  to  globalize  information 
science/informatics as technosciences only makes sense as part of 
a much broader program of political globalization, one that will 
likely involve government, not just technocratic governance.  
Shoshona  Zuboff  grew  skeptical  of  the  ability  of 
corporations  to informate.   As she says on her current website: 
“…I realized that I no longer believed in the progressive vision of 
the  corporation”.   I-Schools,  fortunately,  need  not  accept  the 
confines  of  the  corporation  in  order  to  pursue  an  informating 
strategy.
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